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Abstract
We consider in this paper some structured financial products, known as reverse convertible
notes, that resulted in substantial losses to certain buyers of these notes in recent years. We shall
focus on specific reverse convertible notes known as “Autocallable Optimization Securities with
Contingent Protection Linked to the S&P 500 Financial Index,” because these notes are repre-
sentative of the broad spectrum of reverse convertibles notes. Therefore, the analysis provided in
this paper is applicable to many other reverse convertible notes.
We begin by describing the notes in detail and identifying potential areas of confusion in
the pricing supplement to the prospectus for the notes. We deduce two possible interpretations
of the payment procedure for the notes and apply the Law of Total Expectation to develop a
probabilistic analysis for each interpretation. We also determine the corresponding expected net
payments to note-holders under various scenarios for the financial markets and show that, under
a broad range of scenarios, note-holders were likely to suffer substantial losses.
As a consequence, we infer that the prospectus is sufficiently complex that financial advisers
generally lacked the mathematical knowledge and expertise to understand the prospectus com-
pletely. Therefore, financial advisers who recommended purchases of the notes did not have
the knowledge and expertise that is required by a fiduciary relationship, hence were unable to
exercise fiduciary duty, and ultimately misguided their clients. We conclude that these reverse
convertibles notes were designed by financial institutions to insure themselves, against significant
declines in the equities markets, at the expense of note-holders.
1 Introduction
In July, 2011 the U.S. Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) issued an alert [2]
concerning the sale of structured financial products known as “reverse convertible notes.”
These notes were issued by many financial firms and sold widely to clients who had an op-
timistic view of future market conditions and who were seeking to diversify their financial
portfolios. Clients were promised high yields, and phrases such as “autocallable optimiza-
tion” or “contingent protection” in the titles of the notes imbued clients with a high sense of
confidence in the future of these notes. However, the notes turned out not to be as simple
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or as safe as customers had thought initially, and buyers of these notes eventually suffered
enormous losses when the financial markets experienced a significant downturn in 2008.
The U.S. Securities Exchange and Commission (SEC) defines a reverse convertible note
to be a financial product whose return is linked to the performance of a “reference asset” or a
“basket of reference assets,” usually consisting of the stock price of an unrelated company or
the level of a stock market index. Some common reference assets for such notes are the S&P
500 Financials Index, the EURO STOXX 50, and the common stock of JPMorgan Chase &
Co. or other prominent corporations. In this paper, we will investigate an autocallable note, a
common type of reverse convertible note. Autocallable notes have one or more “call dates,”
which are dates on which the note can be redeemed prior to the maturity date and which are
determined by specific market conditions. A wide variety of reverse convertible notes have
been sold to the public since 2006, with sales continuing even today, and these notes can
be examined in a manner similar to the analysis given in this paper. Therefore, the analysis
provided in this paper serves as a template for the study of many reverse convertibles notes.
In this paper, we investigate a particular reverse convertible note known as “Autocallable
Optimization Securities with Contingent Protection Linked to the S&P 500 Financials Index.”
This financial product was issued by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in early 2008, before the
2007-2008 financial crisis reached its nadir, and the pricing supplement to the prospectus for
this note can be obtained from the SEC’s website at [8]. We will study the pricing supplement
to the prospectus, and provide a description of the note and its key features. This pricing
supplement is similar to the pricing supplements for many other reverse convertible notes
issued by other financial companies.
At first glance, the pricing supplement to the prospectus appears to provide a promising
description of the note; however, on examining the pricing supplement in detail, we found
some disturbing attributes. First, the term “contingent protection” in the title causes this
financial product to appear more secure than it really is. The phrase “contingent protection”
may suggest that there is some legal or financial protection on the notes, thereby causing
some customers to become more confident about the returns on their purchases. Therefore,
we will first assess the weaknesses of the contingent-protection feature of these notes.
Another concern is that the details of the pricing supplement could have been confusing
to a financially unsophisticated client and as a result, many clients would have found it dif-
ficult to understand complete details of the note. Our second task, therefore, is to describe
some vaguenesses that we have found in the prospectus regarding the payment procedure
and redemption rules. In order to assess these details we will analyze the method used to
determine payment and describe two interpretations of the payment procedure.
Next, we provide a probabilistic analysis of the payment procedure and use the Law of
Total Expectation to calculate the expected net returns to clients. We will show, based on the
results derived from our analysis, that customers were at a substantial disadvantage from the
very moment they purchased this note. We deduce from our analysis that the average client
would have lost a significant proportion of their principal; in some situations, those losses
could be as high as 50%.
At this point, we provide some remarks on the concept of fiduciary duty. Many state laws
and the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 require that certain financial advisers act as
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fiduciaries in their business transactions with clients. West’s Encyclopedia of American Law
[3] defines a fiduciary relationship as “one which encompasses the idea of faith and confi-
dence and is generally established only when the confidence is given by one and accepted by
another.” “A fiduciary has greater knowledge and expertise of the matters being handled and
is held to a standard of conduct and trust above that of a casual business person” (Hill [5]).
Fiduciary duty is “the obligation to act in the best interest of the beneficiary of the fiduciary
relationship” (Rahaim [9]).
As a consequence, we will conclude that financial advisers who recommended purchases
of reverse convertible notes in early 2008 did not exercise fiduciary duty to their clients.
Indeed, the prospectus is sufficiently complex that financial advisers themselves could not
have understood every detail of the prospectus. Further, financial advisers lacked the math-
ematical knowledge and expertise necessary to determine the consequences of details in the
prospectus. Therefore, financial advisers simply were unable to exercise fiduciary duty to
their clients, and ultimately the advisers misguided their clients.
We remark that related probabilistic analyses of other types of financial derivatives were
given by Richards and Hundal [10] and Richards [11]; cf. Samuel [13]. Those papers an-
alyzed structured products, such as, return optimization securities, yield magnet notes, re-
verse exchangeable securities, and principal-protected notes. In each case, it was shown that
purchasing these structured products during the mid-2000’s would likely lead to substantial
losses. In this paper, a similar probabilistic analysis will be done on reverse convertible notes
and our analysis will show that the purchase of these notes were likely to result in significant
losses also.
Moreover, Richards [11] observed that certain structured financial products were de-
signed “to insure the banks against substantial declines in the markets; such an arrangement
allowed the banks to avoid direct stock sales on the open market, which could have triggered
widespread market declines.” Likewise, the reverse convertible notes analyzed in this paper
provided a similar safety net to the financial institutions which issued them, but at the expense
of note-holders.
We conclude the introduction with a summary of the results to follow in the remaining
sections of this paper. In Section 2, we provide an assessment of the pricing supplement to
the prospectus. We will point out that seemingly positive features of the payment procedure
for the notes appear to provide overly optimistic views of future market conditions seem to
suggest that clients’ principal are protected against adverse market conditions, and that the
chances of a loss of principal are low. Moreover, the pricing supplement presents positive
features of the notes in the earlier part of the document, and in greater detail. On the other
hand, negative aspects of the notes are described in a less prominent manner; those aspects
are relegated to later sections which are less likely to be read by a typical client; and the
supplement does not provide a comprehensive list of possible payout scenarios for the notes.
We shall also identify problems with the payment procedure for the notes. Indeed, the
description of the payment procedure provided in the payment supplement seems incomplete
and vague. Moreover, the conditions under which the note will be called is unclear, leading
to at least two plausible interpretations of the payment procedure.
In Section 3, we describe and analyze a first interpretation of the payment procedure. We
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shall use the Law of Total Expectation to obtain mathematical formulas for the expected, or
average, payout to a randomly chosen note-holder under a variety of market-outlook scenar-
ios ranging from pessimistic to optimistic. By analyzing graphs of the expected net payment
functions, we shall prove that for the expected net payment to be positive, the market outlook
must necessarily be highly optimistic, and even in such a best-case scenario the note-holder
is likely to be at a disadvantage to the issuing bank because of the call provisions of the note.
As regards pessimistic scenarios, we show that the average return to note-holders can be as
low as -50% in some instances.
In Section 4, we describe a second plausible interpretation of the payment procedure.
We shall show that the expected net payment under this interpretation can never be greater
than the expected net payment under the interpretation analyzed in Section 3. Therefore,
the outcomes for note-holders can be expected generally to be worse than those described in
Section 3. In Section 5, we present some closing remarks on our analysis. We will conclude
that these reverse convertible notes were simply clever marketing scheme used by financial
institutions wanting to insure themselves against future market declines.
2 Assessment of the Pricing Supplement to the Prospectus
Reverse convertibles notes known as “Autocallable Optimization Securities with Contingent
Protection Linked to the S&P 500 Financials Index” were sold to the public in multiples of
$10. The pricing supplement [8] to the prospectus states that the trade date for this financial
product was February 5, 2008, with a settlement date three days later on February 8, 2008.
These notes had an 18-month “observation period,” from May 5, 2008 to August 5, 2009,
with a total of six “observation dates” every three months. The final valuation date was on
August 5, 2009, and the maturity date was five days later on August 10, 2009.
The pricing supplement also mentions information such as the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the note and possible returns that clients might receive from their purchases. How-
ever, the information provided seem biased toward positive aspects of the note. For instance,
the positive aspects are emphasized in a “Features Section” on the first page of the pricing
supplement, and are highlighted in boldfaced font while the explanation of each feature is in
a smaller font. The first feature listed states that the notes provide “positive call return in flat
or bullish scenarios,” implying that clients will receive positive returns as long as the S&P
500 Financials Index remains above a certain level.
Another positive attribute listed in the “Features Section” is that of “contingent principal
protection.” This feature suggests that clients have some protection against loss of principal;
however, the specified market conditions under which the contingent protection applies is
printed in a smaller font on the same page.
The last feature states that the notes “express a bullish view of the U.S. Financial Services
Sector.” Given that the notes are linked to the S&P 500 Financials Index which comprises of
93 companies in the financial services sector of the S&P 500 Index, financial advisers recom-
mending purchases of these notes should have provided their clients with an estimate of the
likelihood that the S&P 500 Financials Index would continue on an upward trend. However,
4
neither advisers nor the pricing supplement appear to have provided any such information.
Indeed, the features listed in the “Features Section” seem to promote optimistic views of
future market conditions, leading clients to believe that their future gains will be high. These
details imply that the clients’ principals are protected against adverse market conditions and
their chances of a loss of principal are low. Moreover, buyers of these notes were more
likely to read the first few sections in greater detail compared to the later sections. Thus, the
positive aspects of these notes may have played a more influential role in clients’ decisions
to purchase the notes.
On the other hand, negative aspects of the note are portrayed in a less prominent manner
and are postponed to later sections of the pricing supplement. For instance, the fact that the
note is not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is stated in smaller
font. The section “Key Risks,” which lists numerous risk factors, appears as one of the
last sections in the pricing supplement. Also, the pricing supplement provides no mention
of the likelihood that downward trends in the market can occur, leading to a total loss of
capital. Moreover, the prospectus implies that future market conditions will be positive but
then warns later against the expectation of a “positive-return environment.” Further, based on
the pricing supplement’s guidelines for net payment, the greatest possible return on the note
is only 31.26%, whereas the greatest possible loss is 100% of capital. That is, profits on the
note are limited to a specific percentage while there is no similar limit on the percentage of
capital that clients might lose.
Another major concern is the description of the payment method given in the pricing
supplement; in our view the description is incomplete. The pricing supplement provides only
four examples of possible scenarios of the future market trends. In our view, the supplement
should have provided a more comprehensive list of such scenarios. In two of the scenarios
presented the client receives a positive return; in one scenario the client breaks even, and in
only one scenario does the client lose part of their principal. Also, no example is given to
demonstrate how a client could have suffered a loss of their entire capital. Therefore, these
examples may have led some clients to believe that they were more likely to receive positive
returns rather than losses.
Moreover, the details in the scenario analysis are vague. Specifically, the determination
of the conditions under which the note will be called is unclear, and therefore we will now
investigate the payment procedure in great detail.
In order to describe the payment method, we need to define several terms. The Index
Starting Level is the closing level of the S&P 500 Financials Index on February 5, 2008. The
pricing supplement states the Index Starting Level to be 369.44. The Trigger Level is 184.72,
which is 50% of the Index Starting Level. The Index Ending Level is the closing level of the
S&P 500 Financials Index on the corresponding observation or trade date. Having defined
these terms, we can define the Index Return, denoted by I , to be
I =
Index Ending Level− Index Starting Level
Index Starting Level
.
By means of this formula, we see that if the Index Ending Level on any trade date is at or
above the Index Starting Level then the Index Return will be positive, i.e. I ≥ 0, while if
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on any trade date the Index Ending Level is less than the Index Starting Level then the Index
Return will be negative, i.e. I < 0. Also, if the Index Ending Level is less than the Trigger
Level then I < −0.5 and conversely.
The section of the pricing supplement entitled “Payment at Maturity” contains a diagram
which is used to illustrate the rules for calculating net payments to clients. The diagram pre-
sented here is typical, and hence representative of related diagrams appearing in the pricing
supplements of many other autocallable notes found via the SEC’s website. This diagram is
the primary source in the pricing supplement devoted to determining the payment procedure
and it is reproduced in Figure 1, as follows:
Was the closing
level of the Index
on any Observation
Date at or above
the Index Starting
Level?
You will receive the applicable Call
Price as described under “Indicative
Terms—Return on Call Date” if the
Notes have not been previously called.
Was the closing
level of the Index
below the Trigger
Level on any
trading day during
the Observation
Period?
At maturity, you will receive your
principal of $10 per Note.
Determine the
Index Return
At maturity, you will receive your
principal reduced by an amount based
on the percentage decrease in the
Index from the Index Starting Level to
the Index Ending Level, calculated as
follows:
$10 × (1 + Index Return)
In this scenario, you could lose
some or all of your principal
depending on how much the
Index decreases.
Yes
No
No
Yes
Figure 1: Payment at Maturity, as Depicted in the Pricing Supplement
From Figure 1, we deduce that if I > 0 on an observation date, then the note might be
called and redeemed for an amount stated in the pricing supplement. This redemption value
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is based on a rate of 20.84% per annum, with actual amounts stated in the “Final Terms”
section of the supplement. This “Final Terms” section states each observation date and the
corresponding percentage return if the note is called on that date.
However, if I < 0 on a particular observation date then the note is not called. Also, if
I < −0.5 on any trading date during the observation period then there is a possibility that
the client will receive a negative return at maturity. In particular, the diagram stated that the
client can lose up to a 100% of their capital but provided no indication of the probability
of this occurrence. Also, the diagram itself does not make it explicit when the note will be
called, but as long as the notes are not called then the calculation of the Index Return will be
done on every subsequent trading date until the final valuation date.
To determine the actual return that note-holders will receive on their notes is particularly
vague. It appears that the notes could have been called before the final valuation date, and
at the complete discretion of the sellers. Suppose also that the Index Return, when measured
on the final valuation date, is substantially greater than zero, i.e., the Index Ending Level
is higher than the Index Starting Level; then the language used in the pricing supplement
appears to give the seller of the note the power to have called the note in a way so as to
minimize the return to note holders. Therefore, it seems that the manner in which payments
to clients are determined can be interpreted in different ways. In the following two sections
we will analyze two likely interpretations of the payment procedure that could have been
used and we will estimate the average return to clients under each interpretation.
3 A First Interpretation of the Payment Procedure
In this section, we describe and analyze one of the possible interpretations of the payment
procedure for calculating net payment. For this interpretation, we will show that even under
optimistic scenarios, an average buyer will lose a substantial amount of their principal.
For each observation date within the 18-month period from February 5, 2008 to August
5, 2009, we define the corresponding index return as follows:
I1 : Index return on May 5, 2008
I2 : Index return on August 5, 2008
I3 : Index return on November 5, 2008
I4 : Index return on February 5, 2009
I5 : Index return on May 5, 2009
I6 : Index return on August 5, 2009
Let n denote the total number of trading days during the 18-month observation period.
We have verified through Google Finance’s website on historical closing prices of the S&P
500 Financials Index, that for this note n = 381 trading days. For 1, . . . , n, define di to be
the cumulative index return for Day i; thus di represents the total index return from Day 1,
February 5, 2008, to Day i.
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Let dmin = min (d1, d2, ..., dn) be the smallest daily cumulative return over the entire
observation period.
Using this notation, the steps for this interpretation of the payment procedure can now be
described as follows:
Step 1: Calculate the Index Return, Ir on the observation date for the rth
quarter.
Step 2: If the Index Return on the observation date is non-negative, i.e. if
Ir ≥ 0, then the note is called and the client receives an amount as
stated in the pricing supplement on the Final Valuation date.
Step 3: If the Index Return on the observation date is negative, i.e. if Ir < 0
then we calculate the cumulative returns, di, for each trading date
during the quarter corresponding to the given observation date. If
any of those cumulative returns are less than −50% then we record
this occurrence for future reference.
Step 4: Return to Step 1 for the next observation date and repeat the process.
Steps 1-4 are carried out on every observation date until the final valuation date or until the
note is called.
At the Final Valuation date, one of the following three cases can occur:
Case 1: If the Index Return is non-negative on the Final Valuation date i.e.
if I6 ≥ 0, then the client receives the amount stated in the pricing
supplement.
Case 2: If the Index Return on the Final Valuation date is negative and every
daily Index Ending Level remained at or above the Trigger Level on
each trading date during the entire observation period, i.e. if I6 < 0
and dmin ≥ −50%, then the client receives $10 at maturity.
Case 3: If on any trading date prior to the Final Valuation Date at least one
daily Index Ending Level breached the Trigger Level, i.e. if dmin <
−50%, then the client receives a reduced payment equal to 10(1+I6),
representing a negative return of I6 to note-holders.
The following tree diagram describes this interpretation of the payment procedure:
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Trade Date (Feb. 5, 2008)
Go to Observation Date #1:
Is I1 ≥ 0 on May 5, 2008?
No: Then was any di < −50%
during Feb. 5-May 5, 2008?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $10.52
Yes: Notes are not called
No: Then go to Observation Date #2:
Is I2 ≥ 0 on Aug. 5, 2008
No: Then was any di < −50%
during May 6-Aug. 5, 2008?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $11.04
Yes: Notes are not called
No: Then go to Observation Date #3:
Is I3 ≥ 0 on Nov. 5, 2008?
No: Then was any di < −50%
during Aug. 6-Nov. 5, 2008?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $11.56
Yes: Notes are not called
No: Then go to Observation Date #4:
Is I4 ≥ 0 on Feb. 5, 2009
No: Then was any di < −50%
during Nov. 6, 2008-Feb. 5, 2009?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $12.08
Yes: Notes are not called
No: Then go to Observation Date #5:
Is I5 ≥ 0 on May 5, 2009?
No: Then was any di < −50%
during Feb. 6-May 5, 2009?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $12.61
Yes: Notes are not called
No: Then go to the Final Valuation
Date: Is I6 ≥ 0 on Aug. 5, 2009?
No: Then was any di < −50%
during the observation period?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $13.13
Yes: Notes mature;
pay note-holders $10(1 + I6)
No: Notes mature;
pay note-holders $10
Figure 2: Schematic Description of the Payment Procedure
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Then, according to the pricing supplement [8] and this payment procedure, the net pay-
ment in U.S. dollars, to note-holders is given by the function,
Net Payment =

0.52, if I1 ≥ 0
1.04, if I1 < 0, and I2 ≥ 0
1.56, if Ij < 0, j = 1, 2 and I3 ≥ 0
2.08, if Ij < 0, j = 1, 2, 3 and I4 ≥ 0
2.61, if Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 and I5 ≥ 0
3.13, if Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 and I6 ≥ 0
0, if Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 and dmin ≥ −12
10I6, if Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 and dmin < −12
(3.1)
• The first six cases occur if any of the index returns, I1, . . . , I6 are non-negative, in
which case, the note is called on the corresponding observation date, and the client
receives a positive return on the Final Valuation date in those instances.
• The seventh case occurs if all of the index returns, I1, . . . , I6 are negative and the
minimum cumulative daily index return during the observation period, dmin is at least
−50%. In this case, the note matures and the client receives a net payment of zero on
the Final Valuation date, i.e. the client breaks even.
• The eighth and last case occurs if the note is not called previously and dmin, the mini-
mum cumulative daily index return during the observation period, is less than −50%;
i.e. the smallest Index Ending Level falls below the Trigger Level. In this case, the
note matures and on the Final Valuation date the client receives a negative net payment
of 10I6.
In the net payment function in (3.1), the index returns I1, . . . , I6 are continuous random
variables whose joint probability density function is strictly positive for I1, . . . , I6 in the
interval (−1, 0); i.e. there is a non-zero probability of a downward market trend in the future.
Hence,
P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) 6= 0 (3.2)
since there always exists the possibility of decreasing market trends.
We now apply the Law of Total Expectation (Ross [12], page 333, Equation (5.1b)) to the
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net payment function in (3.1); then we obtain
E(Net Payment) = 0.52× P (I1 ≥ 0)
+ 1.04× P (I1 < 0, and I2 ≥ 0)
+ 1.56× P (Ij < 0, j = 1, 2 and I3 ≥ 0)
+ 2.08× P (Ij < 0, j = 1, 2, 3 and I4 ≥ 0)
+ 2.61× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 and I5 ≥ 0)
+ 3.13× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 and I6 ≥ 0)
+ 0× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 and dmin ≥ −12)
+ 10× E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6).
(3.3)
In a real-world setting, the index return random variables I1, . . . , I6 are unlikely to be
independent. In fact, there are numerous research articles which have found evidence that
momentum-trading “strategies which buy stocks that have performed well in the past and
sell stocks that have performed poorly in the past generate significant positive returns over
3- to 12-month holding periods” (Jegadeesh and Titman [7]; Conrad and Kaul [1]); this
phenomenon has been observed to hold not only for U.S. financial markets but also inter-
nationally (Hurn [6]). Therefore, if the financial index has recorded a negative return in a
three-month period then it is natural to expect traders to be pessimistic about the ensuing
three-month period. Therefore, we would expect to find that, for example,
P (I2 ≥ 0|I1 < 0) ≤ P (I2 < 0|I1 < 0) (3.4)
in a real-world setting.
We recognize that there can be exceptions to this inequality; if, for instance, the markets
are in a euphoric state of mind, where any downturn is regarded optimistically as a sign of
positive future developments then the above inequality might even be reversed at times. Since
it is unrealistic and unwise to treat the markets as being in a permanent state of euphoria, we
will treat this inequality as being valid generally. Therefore for the purposes of analyzing the
expected net payment to note-holders, we will assume that the inequality (3.4) holds.
We remark that because
P (I2 ≥ 0|I1 < 0) + P (I2 < 0|I1 < 0) = 1, (3.5)
then the inequality (3.4) implies that
P (I2 ≥ 0|I1 < 0) ≤ 12 ≤ P (I2 < 0|I1 < 0). (3.6)
Also, (3.5) implies that if P (I2 ≥ 0|I1 < 0) is large, i.e. close to one, then, P (I2 < 0|I1 < 0)
is small, i.e. close to zero.
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Figure 3: Closing Levels of the S&P 500 Financials Index for September 20, 2002 to De-
cember 28, 2007
At this point, it is worthwhile to provide historical context relating to the state of the
financial markets in early 2008, at the same time when these reverse convertible notes were
being sold to the public. Figure 3 was obtained from Google Finance’s website and is based
on historical closing prices from September 20, 2002 to December 28, 2007 of the S&P 500
Financials Index.
As Figure 3 shows, the S&P 500 Financial Index had undergone a sustained increase
during the period 2002 to late 2007. By early 2008, many investors were concerned that
the bull market had gone too far and that stock prices might be due for substantial declines.
Therefore, it was reasonable to expect that P (Ir < 0) was large for the rth quarter, hence,
P (Ir ≥ 0) was small for that quarter.
Given the statistical evidence that momentum-trading strategies are successful over 3- to
12-month periods, we also would have expected P (I2 < 0|I1 < 0) to be high in late 2007,
hence that P (I2 ≥ 0|I1 < 0) was small. Then it follows that
P (I1 < 0, and I2 ≥ 0) ≡ P (I2 ≥ 0|I1 < 0)P (I1 < 0)
< P (I2 ≥ 0|I1 < 0),
which proves that P (I1 < 0, and I2 ≥ 0) also is small. By repeating this argument, we
deduce that, in early 2008, each of the probabilities in the first six terms in (3.3) are very
small. Therefore,
E(Net Payment) ' 10E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
(3.7)
which, clearly, is negative. Consequently, we deduce that clients who purchased these reverse
convertible notes in early 2008 likely were destined to obtain negative net returns, on average.
Even more can be deduced from (3.7). By late 2007, P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) and P (dmin <
−1
2
|Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) both were very large. Hence, by (3.7),
E(Net Payment) ' 10× E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6). (3.8)
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If it was believed in early 2008 that the financial markets were likely to have a precipitous,
quarter-over-quarter, fall over the next 18 months, then it would mean that I6 ' dmin, in
which case it follows from (3.8) that
E(Net Payment) ' 10× E(dmin|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
< 10×−0.5
= −5.
Consequently, the outcome of purchasing these reverse convertible notes in early 2008 was
to undertake a substantial risk of least a 50% loss of capital, on average.
Admittedly, the analysis provided above is based on a pessimistic view in 2007-2008 of
coming trends in the financial markets. To provide an analysis which is based on an unbi-
ased approach toward future market trends, we will therefore treat the market as a “random
walk” in which I1, . . . , I6 are mutually independent and identically distributed random vari-
ables. These assumptions imply that medium-term momentum-based strategies will provide
a trader with no advantages over the general market. Also, such an assumption will be more
profitable for a client who purchased reverse convertible notes in 2008, for it means that the
various probabilities appearing in the first six cases in the expected net-payment function are
likely to be more favorable to the clients than would have been the case under the real-world
assumption underlying the inequality (3.4).
Nevertheless, under the assumptions that I1, . . . , I6 are mutually independent and identi-
cally distributed, we shall show that the expected net-payment to note-holders still remains
significantly negative. Hence, we will deduce that even in a “random walk” scenario an
average note-holder would have faced losses except under highly optimistic environments.
Using the assumption that I1, . . . , I6 are independent, we see that equation (3.3) becomes
E(Net Payment) = 0.52× P (I1 ≥ 0)
+ 1.04× P (I1 < 0)× P (I2 ≥ 0)
+ 1.56×
[
2∏
j=1
P (Ij < 0)
]
× P (I3 ≥ 0)
+ 2.08×
[
3∏
j=1
P (Ij < 0)
]
× P (I4 ≥ 0)
+ 2.61×
[
4∏
j=1
P (Ij < 0)
]
× P (I5 ≥ 0)
+ 3.13×
[
5∏
j=1
P (Ij < 0)
]
× P (I6 ≥ 0)
+ 10× E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)×
6∏
j=1
P (Ij < 0).
(3.9)
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Denote P (I1 ≥ 0) by p, because of the assumption that I1, . . . , I6 are identically dis-
tributed, it follows that p ≡ P (Ij ≥ 0) for all j = 1, . . . , 6. Note that, p is the probability that
the note is called, i.e. that the Index Return on any given observation date was non-negative.
Then, we obtain
E(Net Payment) = 0.52p+ 1.04(1− p)p+ 1.56(1− p)2p
+ 2.08(1− p)3p+ 2.61(1− p)4p+ 3.13(1− p)5p
+ 10× E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)× (1− p)6.
(3.10)
In order to derive explicit values for the terms
E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
and
P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6),
we would need to make strong assumptions about the random variables I1, . . . , I6, which we
prefer to avoid doing. Therefore, we will assign values to these terms to reflect a variety of
market conditions, and then we will study the resulting behavior of the function (3.10) for
each set of values.
Define
B1 ≡ −E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6). (3.11)
Note that the expectation E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) clearly is negative; hence,
B1 < 0. Also, because I6 ≥ −1, then B1 ≤ 1. Therefore, we have 0 < B1 ≤ 1.
Also, define
B2 ≡ P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6); (3.12)
clearly, 0 ≤ B2 ≤ 1 because it is a probability. Moreover, by (3.2), B2 6= 0; therefore
0 < B2 ≤ 1.
By (3.10), we obtain
E(Net Payment) = 0.52p+ 1.04(1− p)p+ 1.56(1− p)2p+ 2.08(1− p)3p
+ 2.61(1− p)4p+ 3.13(1− p)5p− 10B1B2(1− p)6.
(3.13)
For p = 0, we obtain E(Net Payment) = −10B1B2 < 0. Therefore, there will always be a
small interval around p = 0 where the expected net payment is negative.
As regards an interpretation for values of B1, we offer the following. Suppose that B1
is small; then it follows from (3.11) that E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) is close
to zero and is negative. Hence, for small values of B1, a note-holder will receive a small,
but negative, overall expected return despite the conditioning event that I1, . . . , I6 all are
negative. That is to say, although the index returns on all six observation dates were negative,
and the minimum cumulative daily return is less than -50%, the final outcome was that the
average loss to note-holders nevertheless turned out to be small.
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Hence, small values ofB1 indicate that the financial markets are likely to have maintained
an optimistic outlook throughout the 18-month observation period despite consecutive quar-
terly losses. This leads us to associate small values of B1 with general optimism amongst
market participants, and by a similar argument, we can associate large values of B1 with
broad market pessimism.
In the case ofB2, it follows from (3.12) that ifB2 is small then there is a small probability
of any daily cumulative index return breaching the Trigger Level, conditional on six consec-
utive quarterly losses. In a real-world situation, consecutive quarterly losses usually induces
general gloom on market participants; so it would indeed be an optimistic assumption to be-
lieve that there remains a small probability of avoiding the Trigger Level. Therefore, we see
that small values of B2 can be associated with a generally optimistic market outlook; and by
the same argument, large values of B2 can be associated with broad market pessimism.
Consider the case in which B1 = B2 = 0.1. Using these values, we plot (3.13) with
respect to p, 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, to obtain in Figure 4 a graph of the expected net payment function:
Figure 4: A Graph of Expected Net Payments, where B1 = 0.1 and B2 = 0.1
In this case, the maximum expected net payment is 1.15, approximately, i.e., an average
return of about 11.5%. Also, the minimum expected net payment is −0.1, approximately,
i.e., an average loss of about 10%. Thus, even under this optimistic scenario, the average
client could lose as much as 10% of their capital.
We remark also that the expected net payment is maximized at p = 0.29, approximately.
Although it might have been presumed that consecutive quarterly increases in the financial
markets, i.e., p = 1, would be more beneficial to note-holders, such a scenario would have
caused the note to be called early due to the sustained market increases. In such a case,
paradoxically, average returns to note-holders would have been diminished.
Under a less-optimistic scenario for the financial markets, in which B1 = B2 = 0.5, the
graph of expected net payment function in (3.13) is given in Figure 5:
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Figure 5: A Graph of Expected Net Payments, where B1 = 0.5 and B2 = 0.5
For this situation, the maximum expected net payment is 0.97, approximately, i.e., an
average return of about 9.7%. Also, the minimum expected net payment is −2.5, approxi-
mately, representing an average loss of about 25% of principal. As in the previous scenario,
moderate values of p turn out to be more beneficial to note-holders than high values of p.
If financial markets are expected to undergo significant downturns where the values ofB1
and B2 are relatively high, say B1 = 0.7 and B2 = 0.8, then we obtain in Figure 6 the graph
of the expected net payment function in (3.13):
Figure 6: A Graph of Expected Net Payments, where B1 = 0.7 and B2 = 0.8
Under this pessimistic scenario, the highest expected net payment is 0.89, approximately,
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which means that the maximum percentage return for the average note-holder was only about
8.9%. On the other hand, the minimum expected net payment is −5.6, approximately, im-
plying that the average note-holder could have suffered percentage losses of as much as 56%
of their capital.
We have studied up to now the exact values of the expected net payment function which,
as we have seen, involves two unknown parameters,B1 andB2. We now derive upper bounds
for the expected net payment function; these bounds will have the advantage of depending
on only one unknown parameter.
We know that dmin ≤ Ir for any r = 1, . . . , 6; therefore,
P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) ≥ P (Ir < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6). (3.14)
Also, the expectation E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) < 0 because I6 < 0 in the
conditioning event. Therefore, by inequality (3.14), we see that
E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
≤ E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)P (Ir < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6),
(3.15)
and then, by (3.15), we obtain
E(Net Payment) ≤ 0.52p+ 1.04(1− p)p+ 1.56(1− p)2p
+ 2.08(1− p)3p+ 2.61(1− p)4p+ 3.13(1− p)5p
+ 10(1− p)6E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (Ir < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6).
(3.16)
By the definition of conditional probability and the assumptions that I1, . . . , I6 are inde-
pendent and identically distributed,
P (Ir < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) = P (Ir < −12 |Ir < 0)
=
P (Ir < −12 and Ir < 0)
P (Ir < 0)
=
P (Ir < −12)
P (Ir < 0)
= (1− p)−1P (Ir < −12).
(3.17)
Thus, by (3.16) and (3.17),
E(Net Payment)
≤ 0.52p+ 1.04(1− p)p+ 1.56(1− p)2p
+ 2.08(1− p)3p+ 2.61(1− p)4p+ 3.13(1− p)5p
+ 10(1− p)5E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)P (Ir < −12).
(3.18)
We can also obtain a lower bound on E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6). To that
end, define
A1 = {Ir < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6}
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and
A2 = {dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6}.
Because dmin ≤ Ir for r = 1, . . . , 6 then it follows that A1 ⊆ A2.
Consider the cumulative index returns d1, . . . , dn, viewed as continuous random vari-
ables. The sets A1 and A2 above clearly are events that depend on d1, . . . , dn. Because
A1 ⊆ A2 then it follows that
P (A1) ≤ P (A2). (3.19)
We noted earlier in this section in (3.2) that P (A2) 6= 0; by a similar argument, it follows that
P (A1) 6= 0. As mentioned previously, this condition holds because I1, . . . , I6 are continuous
random variables whose probability density function is strictly positive on the interval (-1,0),
a condition which is equivalent to the assumption that there is a non-zero probability of the
markets moving downward in any quarter.
Let f(d1, . . . , dn) denote the joint probability density function of I1, . . . , I6. Since I6 ≡
I6(d1, . . . , dn) is a function of the random variables d1, . . . , dn then, by the definition of
expected value, we obtain
E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
≡ E(I6|A2)
=
1
P (A2)
∫
A2
I6(x1, . . . , xn) · f(x1, . . . , xn) dx1 · · · dxn.
(3.20)
Because I6 < 0 for all (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ A2 and because A1 ⊆ A2 then it follows that∫
A2
I6(x1, . . . , xn) · f(x1, . . . , xn) dx1 · · · dxn
≤
∫
A1
I6(x1, . . . , xn) · f(x1, . . . , xn) dx1 · · · dxn. (3.21)
It now follows that from (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21) that
E(I6|A2) = 1
P (A2)
∫
A2
I6(x1, . . . , xn) · f(x1, . . . , xn) dx1 · · · dxn
≤ 1
P (A1)
∫
A1
I6(x1, . . . , xn) · f(x1, . . . , xn) dx1 · · · dxn
≡ E(I6|A1).
(3.22)
This proves that
E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) ≤ E(I6|Ir < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6). (3.23)
Hence for any r = 1, . . . , 6,
E(Net Payment)
≤ 0.52p+ 1.04(1− p)p+ 1.56(1− p)2p
+ 2.08(1− p)3p+ 2.61(1− p)4p+ 3.13(1− p)5p
+ 10(1− p)5E(I6|Ir < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)P (Ir < −12).
(3.24)
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Also, note that the inequality (3.24) involves the random variables I1, . . . , I6 only, and does
not depend on dmin. Thus, we can select r = 6 to obtain
E(Net Payment)
≤ 0.52p+ 1.04(1− p)p+ 1.56(1− p)2p
+ 2.08(1− p)3p+ 2.61(1− p)4p+ 3.13(1− p)5p
+ 10(1− p)5E(I6|I6 < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)P (I6 < −12).
(3.25)
It is clear that
E(I6|I6 < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) < −12 . (3.26)
We now introduce the notation τ = P (I6 < −12); then it clear that p + τ ≤ 1. Therefore, it
follows from (3.25) and (3.26) that
E(Net Payment) ≤ 0.52p+ 1.04(1− p)p+ 1.56(1− p)2p
+ 2.08(1− p)3p+ 2.61(1− p)4p+ 3.13(1− p)5p
− 5(1− p)5τ.
(3.27)
Under an optimistic scenario, we expect there is a small probability of I6 breaching the
Trigger Level, i.e., τ is small. For instance, let τ = 0.1, then we obtain in Figure 7 a graph
of the right-hand side of (3.27):
[p]
Figure 7: Upper Bound for Expected Net Payments, where P (I6 < −12) = 0.1
In this case, an upper bound for the maximum expected net payment is 1.08, approx-
imately, resulting in an upper bound for the average return of about 10.8%. On the other
hand, an upper bound for the minimum expected net payment is−0.5, approximately, i.e., an
average loss of about 5%.
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Suppose we let τ = 0.5; then we obtain in Figure 8 a graph of the upper bound for the
expected net payment function in (3.27):
Figure 8: Upper Bound for Expected Net Payments, where P (I6 < −12) = 0.5
Under this mildly pessimistic scenario, the highest value for an upper bound for expected
net payment is 0.91, approximately; and an upper bound for the lowest expected net payment
is −2.5, approximately. Equivalently, an upper bound for the average return to note-holders
is about 9.1%, whereas an upper bound for the average loss to note-holders is about 25%.
Now consider a highly pessimistic scenario for the financial markets in which τ = 0.8;
then Figure 9 depicts an upper bound for the expected net payment given by (3.27):
Figure 9: Upper Bound for Expected Net Payments, where P (I6 < −12) = 0.8
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For this scenario, an upper bound for the maximum expected net payment is 0.85, ap-
proximately. On the other hand an upper bound for the lowest expected net payment is −4,
approximately. These values imply that an upper bound for the the return for the average
client is about 8.5% while an upper bound for the possible loss is about 40%.
In conclusion, Figures 3.3–3.8 depict upper bounds for expected net payments under
various scenarios. As a general rule, the highest values for expected net payments occur
at moderate values of p and not at high values of p, as one would first presume. Under a
scenario in which markets are expected to undergo significant upward trends and the value
of p is high, the note will be called early and therefore will limit returns to note-holders.
Based on our analysis of the six scenarios depicted in Figures 3.3–3.8, the best-case
scenario leads to a possible maximum an average return of 11.5%, approximately, and a
possible average loss of 10%, approximately. The worst-case scenario is an average return of
8%, approximately, and an average loss of 56%, approximately.
Bearing in mind that only six scenarios were described above in detail, we also provide a
more comprehensive analysis by graphing the upper bound function in (3.27) over all values
of (p, τ) such that 0 ≤ p, τ ≤ 1 and p + τ ≤ 1. Then we obtain the following three-
dimensional plot of expected net payments:
Figure 10: Upper Bound for Expected Net Payments as a function of p and τ
From this analysis, the best-case scenario is an expected net payment of at most 1.16,
approximately, at p = 0.28 and τ = 0. On the other hand, the worst-case scenario results in
an expected net payment of at most −5, approximately, at p = 0 and τ = 1. Thus, the net
percentage return for note-holders ranges from −50% to 11.6%, approximately. This range
implies that on average, the possible returns to note-holders are substantially lower than the
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potential losses. As a result, an average note-holder would have suffered a significant loss of
capital.
4 A Second Interpretation of the Payment Procedure
We now provide a second interpretation of the payment procedure and analyze it similarly
to the way in which the previous interpretation was assessed. In the interpretation of the
payment procedure studied in the previous section, if an Index Ending Level breached the
Trigger Level during any quarter of the observation period but the Index Return was positive
on a subsequent observation date, then the possibility of a positive return still existed. Be-
cause the prospectus was unclear on this issue, we will assume in this section that if an Index
Ending Level breached the Trigger Level on any trading day during a quarter, i.e. if at least
one cumulative daily index return was less than −50%, then the client is destined to receive
a negative return at the Final Valuation date.
Throughout this section the notation for the six observation dates and the daily cumu-
lative index return will remain the same as before. We also need to define a collection of
minimum daily cumulative index returns as a function of the various observation dates, viz.,
dmin,1 : Minimum cumulative daily index return on May 5, 2008
dmin,2 : Minimum cumulative daily index return on August 5, 2008
dmin,3 : Minimum cumulative daily index return on November 5, 2008
dmin,4 : Minimum cumulative daily index return on February 5, 2009
dmin,5 : Minimum cumulative daily index return on May 5, 2009
dmin,6 : Minimum cumulative daily index return on August 5, 2009
The last minimum cumulative daily index return, dmin:6, is equivalent to dmin in the anal-
ysis provided in Section 3. Also, from this notation it follows that:
dmin,1 ≥ dmin,2 ≥ dmin,3 ≥ dmin,4 ≥ dmin,5 ≥ dmin,6. (4.1)
With this notation, the steps for this interpretation of the payment procedure can now be
described as follows:
Step 1: Calculate the Index Return, Ir on the observation date for the rth
quarter.
Step 2: If the Index Return on the observation date is non-negative, i.e. if
Ir ≥ 0, then the note is called and the client receives an amount as
stated in the pricing supplement on the Final Valuation date.
Step 3: Calculate the cumulative returns, di, for each trading date during the
quarter corresponding to the given observation date and determine
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the minimum cumulative daily index return, dmin,r at this observation
date.
Step 4: If the Index Return on the observation date is negative and the min-
imum cumulative daily return is greater than −50%, i.e. if Ir < 0
and dmin,r ≥ −50%, then we return to Step 1 for the next observation
date and repeat the process.
Step 5: If the Index Return on the observation date is negative and minimum
cumulative daily return is less than −50%, i.e. if Ir < 0 and dmin,t <
−50%, then no further action is taken until the Final Valuation date.
Steps 1-4 are carried out on every observation date until the Final Valuation date or until
the note is called.
We remark that on the Final Valuation date if the note has not been called then all pre-
vious minimum cumulative daily index returns are greater than −50% and by equation (4.1)
dmin,5 ≥ −50%.
At the Final Valuation date, one of the following three cases can occur:
Case 1: If the Index Return on the observation date is non-negative i.e. I6 ≥
0, then the note is called and the client receives an amount as stated
in the pricing supplement on the Final Valuation date.
Case 2: If the Index Return is negative and the minimum cumulative daily
index return is greater than −50% on the Final Valuation date, i.e. if
I6 < 0 and dmin,6 ≥ −50%, then the client receives $10 at maturity.
Case 3: If any minimum cumulative daily index return is less than −50%,
i.e., if dmin,r < −50% for at least one r = 1, . . . , 6, then the client re-
ceives a reduced payment equal to 10(1+I6), representing a negative
return of I6 to note-holders.
Note that on the final valuation date that if at least one dmin,r < −50% then it follows
from inequality (4.1) that
dmin,6 ≤ 50%.
The following tree diagram describes this interpretation of the payment procedure:
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Trade Date (Feb. 5, 2008)
Go to Observation Date #1:
Is I1 ≥ 0 on May 5, 2008?
No: Then was any di < −50%
during Feb. 5-May 5, 2008?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $10.52
No: Then go to Observation Date #2:
Is I2 ≥ 0 on Aug. 5, 2008
No: Then was any di < −50%
during May 6-Aug. 5, 2008?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $11.04
No: Then go to Observation Date #3:
Is I3 ≥ 0 on Nov. 5, 2008?
No: Then was any di < −50%
during Aug. 6-Nov. 5, 2008?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $11.56
No: Then go to Observation Date #4:
Is I4 ≥ 0 on Feb. 5, 2009
No: Then was any di < −50%
during Nov. 6, 2008-Feb. 5, 2009?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $12.08
No: Then go to Observation Date #5:
Is I5 ≥ 0 on May 5, 2009?
No: Then was any di < −50%
during Feb. 6-May 5, 2009?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $12.61
Yes: Notes are not called No: Then go to the Final Valuation
Date: Is I6 ≥ 0 on Aug. 5, 2009?
No: Then was any di < −50%
during the observation period?
Yes: Then call the notes;
pay note-holders $13.13
Yes: Notes mature;
pay note-holders $10(1 + I6)
No: Notes mature;
pay note-holders $10
Figure 11: Schematic Description of a Payment Procedure
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For this interpretation of the payment procedure, we apply the information provided in
the pricing supplement to deduce that the net payment in US dollars is given by:
Net Payment =

0.52, if I1 ≥ 0
1.04, if I1 < 0 and I2 ≥ 0 and dmin,1 ≥ −12
1.56, if Ij < 0, j = 1, 2 and I3 ≥ 0 and dmin,2 ≥ −12
2.08, if Ij < 0, j = 1, 2, 3 and I4 ≥ 0 and dmin,3 ≥ −12
2.61, if Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 and I5 ≥ 0 and dmin,4 ≥ −12
3.13, if Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 and I6 ≥ 0 and dmin,5 ≥ −12
0, if Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 and dmin,6 ≥ −12
10I6, if Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 and dmin,6 < −12
(4.2)
• The first six cases occur if any of the index returns, I1, . . . , I6 are non-negative and the
minimum cumulative daily index return of the previous quarter is at least −50% i.e.,
Ir ≥ 0 and dmin,r−1 ≥ −50%, in which case, the note is called on the corresponding
observation date, and the client receives a positive return in these instances.
• The seventh case occurs if all of the index returns, I1, . . . , I6 are negative and every
minimum cumulative daily index return is at least−50%. In this case, the note matures
and the client receives a net payment of zero, i.e., the client breaks even.
• The eighth and last case occurs if any dmin,r ≤ −50% , i.e. the minimum cumulative
daily index return during some quarter of the observation period fell below −50%. In
this case, the note matures and the client receives a negative net payment of 10I6.
Based on our function for net payment above, we obtain:
E(Net Payment) = 0.52× P (I1 ≥ 0)
+ 1.04× P (I1 < 0 and I2 ≥ 0 and dmin,1 ≥ −12)
+ 1.56× P (Ij < 0, j = 1, 2 and I3 ≥ 0 and dmin,2 ≥ −12)
+ 2.08× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3 and I4 ≥ 0 and dmin,3 ≥ −12)
+ 2.61× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 and I5 ≥ 0 and dmin,4 ≥ −12)
+ 3.13× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 and I6 ≥ 0 and dmin,5 ≥ −12)
+ 0× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 and dmin,6 ≥ −12)
+ 10× E(I6|dmin,6 < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (dmin,6 < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6).
(4.3)
Consider the probabilities appearing in the second thru sixth terms in (4.3), It is clear that
for each r = 1, . . . , 6,
P (Ij < 0, j = 1, . . . , r − 1, Ir ≥ 0, dmin,r−1 ≥ 12)
≤ P (Ij < 0, j = 1, . . . , r − 1, Ir ≥ 0). (4.4)
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Also, as noted earlier, dmin,6 ≡ dmin, the minimum cumulative index return encountered
in Section 3. Therefore, it follows from (4.3) and (4.4) that
E(Net Payment) ≤ 0.52× P (I1 ≥ 0)
+ 1.04× P (I1 < 0, and I2 ≥ 0)
+ 1.56× P (Ij < 0, j = 1, 2 and I3 ≥ 0)
+ 2.08× P (Ij < 0, j = 1, 2, 3 and I4 ≥ 0)
+ 2.61× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 4 and I5 ≥ 0)
+ 3.13× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 5 and I6 ≥ 0)
+ 0× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6 and dmin ≥ −12)
+ 10× E(I6|dmin < −12 and Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (dmin < −12 |Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6)
× P (Ij < 0, 1 ≤ j ≤ 6).
(4.5)
The expression on the right hand side is precisely the expected net payment function
which we derived in Section 3. Therefore, the average return to clients from the interpre-
tation of the payment procedure considered here in Section 4 can be no greater than the
average return from the interpretation in Section 3. Likewise, average losses for this inter-
pretation will be greater than losses in the interpretation of the payment procedure in Section
3. Consequently, it is clear that clients are likely to suffer even greater losses under the new
interpretation of the payment procedure considered in this latter section.
5 Conclusions
In our analysis, we did not consider the effects of income taxes or commissions related to the
sales of these reverse convertible notes. The inclusion of these expenses would have resulted
in smaller returns and greater losses for note-holders.
Further, any financial adviser who was required to exercise fiduciary duty to their clients,
could not have done so by recommending that clients purchase these notes. The SEC has
stated that a financial adviser has a fiduciary duty to make reasonable investment recommen-
dations to clients. Graham [4] defines an investment operation as “one which upon thorough
analysis promises safety of principal and an adequate return.” Had financial advisers carried
out a thorough analysis of these reverse convertible notes then they would have realized that
the notes promised neither safety of principal nor adequate return to clients. As a result, any
financial adviser acting as a fiduciary, should have opposed the purchase of these notes.
We have seen recently an increase in the sales of similar notes by many financial firms;
the prospectuses for these notes are available on the SEC’s website. This increase in sales
perhaps is due to the fact that the financial markets have become increasingly bullish since
2009 and as a result these notes now appear more attractive to persons looking to purchase
fixed-income securities with yields higher than available through U.S. Treasury securities.
However, we predict that if markets undergo substantial downward movements then clients
are again likely to lose substantial capital from purchases of these notes.
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Further, these notes were issued during a time when future market conditions were un-
certain and direct sales of stock may accelerated further downturns. Thus, these notes were
a clever marketing scheme used by financial institutions which wanted to insure themselves
against substantial market declines.
It is particularly noteworthy to observe the actual outcome for the reverse convertible
note [8] which was analyzed in the previous sections. In this case, the Index Starting Level
was 369.44, the Trigger Level was 184.72, and the Index Ending Level and outcome for each
observation date are provided in Table 1:
Table 1: Actual Outcome of a Reverse Convertible Note
Observation Date Index Ending Level Outcome
May 5, 2008 365.48 Below Index Starting Level and Above
Trigger Level; Securities NOT called
August 5, 2008 302.05 Below Index Starting Level and Above
Trigger Level; Securities NOT called
November 5, 2008 201.77 Below Index Starting Level Above
Trigger Level; Securities NOT called
Feb 5, 2008 121.51 Below Index Starting Level and Below
Trigger Level; Securities NOT called
May 5, 2009 155.52 Below Index Starting Level and Below
Trigger Level; Securities NOT called
August 5, 2009 189.37 Below Index Starting Level and Above
Trigger Level; Securities NOT called
Settlement Amount (per $10) $5.13 (total return of -48.7%, or a
compound return of -35.9% per
annum)
Note that the index return on the Final Valuation date equals
Index Starting Return− Index Ending Level
Index Starting Level
=
189.37− 369.44
369.44
= −0.487,
which represents a total loss to the note-holder of 48.7%. Thus, the settlement amount is
$10× (1 + Index Return on the final valuation date) = $10× (1− 0.487)
= $5.13.
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